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NOTES

Vietnam's Contemporary Battle with

the United States: Vying for Most
Favored Nation Trading Status
ABSTRACT

Since the United States and Vietnam signed the Paris
Peace Agreement of 1973, Vietnam has sought to normalize
economic relations with the United States in hopes of gaining
American capital and technology. After the Vietnam War,
however, the United States imposed a trade embargo against
Vietnam and passed legislation denying that country nondiscriminatory trading status. Moreover, Vietnam's past
human rights abuses and its previous unwillingness to
resolve American MIA/POW issues made its ambition of
Recently,
normalized U.S. relations an improbability.
however, in response to Vietnam's renewed cooperation with
U.S. foreign objectives, President Clinton has lifted the trade
embargo against that country and has established U.S.
diplomatic relationswith Vietnam.
Before Vietnam may achieve its goal of truly normalized
relations with the United States, it must obtain a U.S. grantof
mostfavored nation trading status, thereby opening American
borders to Vietnamese goods and encouraging U.S.
investment in Vietnam. To procure such treatment, three
conditions specified by the Trade Act of 1974 must be met.
These include an executive order waiving the requirements of
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Act, a bilateral trade
agreement between Vietnam and the United States, and
Congressionalapproval of the commercial agreement. In this
note, the author examines the options available to the
President under the Trade Act of 1974 in light of Vietnam's
current emigration policies. Next, the author considers the
components of a successful bilateral trade agreement
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between the two countries, highlighting areas that will likely
lead to heavy debate and perhaps even gridlock in contract
negotiations. Finally, the authorconcludes by consideringthe
current political movements in the United States that may
prevent Vietnam's grant of mostfavored nation tradingstatus
in theforeseeablefuture.
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I. INTRODUCTION

At a U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council conference in 1995,
Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam declared, "We
want the United States to be a major trading partner and the lead
investor in Vietnam."' This ambition, however, can be realized
only after the United States fully normalizes its economic

1.
Mark Felsenthal, Vietnamese Pledge Economic Reform; U.S. Wants
Comprehensive Trade Pact, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1690 (Oct. 11, 1995)
available in LEXIS. BNA Library, INTRAD File.
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Such a task, which necessarily
relationship with Vietnam. 2
includes the negotiation of a bilateral trade agreement between
the two countries, will open the Vietnamese market of 70 million
people to U.S. businesses and provide Vietnam with U.S. capital,

technology, and management expertise. 3

Toward this end, the

United States has constructed a "roadmap" which outlines the

required procedure for establishing normal economic ties with
Vietnam. 4 This roadmap specifies a U.S. grant of most favored
as the next step in the
nation (MFN) trading status to Vietnam
5
ongoing process of normalization.

MFN

trading

status

represents

the non-discriminating

treatment that the United States affords to most countries with
Prior to 1947, the United States and its
which it trades. 6
individual trading partners entered separate bilateral trade
agreements which outlined steps to protect each nation's trade
while favoring some trading partners over others. 7 With the
passage of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade8 (GATT) in
1947, however, the United States accepted the GATT provision
obligating member countries to extend MFN status to all

2.

See

NORMALIZATION:

POWELL,

GOLDSTEIN, FRAZER & MURPHY, U.S.-VIETNAM ECONOMIC
1 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.-VIETNAM

CHARTING THE NExT STEPS at

NORMALIZATION].

Vietnam: The Road Ahead: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on East
3.
Asian and PacIfic Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, available In
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File (1991) (statement of Richard H. Solomon,
Assistant Secretary).
4.
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
5.
VLADIMIR N. PREGELJ ET AL., VIETNAM: PROCEDURAL AND JURISDICTIONAL
QUESTIONS REGARDING NORMALIZATION OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS,

CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS No. 95-820S, at CRS-15 (Oct. 11, 1995) [hereinafter
PREGELJ].

U.S.-VIETNAM NORMALIZATION, supra note 2. at 7. Currently, under the
6.
Harmonized Tariff Schedules, the United States maintains two columns of duties.
The first column lists the tax rates applicable to U.S. trading partners to which
MFN treatment has been accorded, while the second column catalogs the duty
rates imposed on imports from countries to which the United States has not
granted MFN status. The differences are substantial and often prohibitive. Id.
For example, cane and bamboo furniture from non-MFN nations is taxed at a
60% rate whereas the same product imported from MFN nations is not subject to
a tariff. Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the U.S., Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988).
7.
Sesto E. Vecchi & Lisa Levaggi Borter, U.S. MFN Statusfor Vietnam. 17

E. ASIAN ExEc. REP. 6 (May 15, 1995).

8.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,

55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GAIT]. The U.S. and over 120 other nations entered
GATT to liberalize trade among member countries by reducing tariff and non-tariff
barriers to manufactured goods and products. Ron Scherer, What You Need to
Know About the GeneralAgreement on Tarffs and Trade (GATT), CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Sept. 15, 1986, at 21. See also Key Questions and Answers About GATT
Trade Agreement, Gannett News Serv., available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS
File, (1994).
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participants of the agreement, even those with which the United
9
States had not previously established bilateral trade agreements.
GATT fused the concept of non-discriminatory treatment of
trading partners with the notion of MFN status I0 by providing in
its section on "General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment" that
"any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties.""
MFN treatment will lead to non-discriminatory trade between
Vietnam and the United States, while greatly decreasing the
tariffs that the United States currently imposes on Vietnamese
imports. 12 Because Vietnam is not a member of GATT, however,
the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter 1974 Act) 13 specifies three
conditions that must be met before the United States can extend
MFN trading status to that country: 14 (1) the President must
either certify that Vietnam permits the free emigration of its
citizens or issue a waiver of that requirement in an attempt to
promote U.S. emigration objectives; 15 (2) the United States and
Vietnam must negotiate a commercial trade agreement
establishing reciprocal non-discriminatory treatment for their
exports; and (3) Congress must approve the agreement
6
established with Vietnam. '
After reviewing the history behind the recent diplomatic
normalization with Vietnam, this Note explores the procedure that
Vietnam must follow to receive MFN trading status. This Note
examines the choices available to a President under the JacksonVanik Amendment as it applies to Vietnam. It then surveys the
feasibility and likelihood of a U.S.-Vietnam commercial trade
agreement necessary to establish reciprocal non-discriminatory
treatment between the two countries. Finally, this Note examines
the controversy surrounding the congressional approval of a trade
agreement with Vietnam, especially in light of the current human
rights violations in Vietnam.
This Note concludes that the
current state of affairs in the United States and Vietnam will

9.
10.
11.
12.
DIG., July
13.
14.
15.
See Id.
16.

U.S.-VIETNAM NORMALIZATION, supra note 2. at 8.
Vecchi & Borter, supra note 7.
GATT, supranote 8, part I, art. I(1), 55 U.N.T.S. at 198.
Jim Ostroff, Vietnam Decree Incites Industry Callfor Quotas, W. WKLY.
12, 1995, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
19 U.S.C. § 210 (1980). See tnfra part III.
U.S.-VIETNAM NORMALIZATION. supra note 2, at 8.
This is required by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Act.
Id.
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likely impair Vietnam's opportunity to obtain MFN trading status
in the near future.

II. A HISTORY

OF CONFLICT

In response to the violent past between the United States and
Vietnam, the United States barred Vietnam from receiving MFN
treatment in the early 1950s. The Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951 required the President to refuse any tariff reductions
on imports from "any nation or area dominated or controlled by
[a] foreign government or foreign organization controlling the
world Communist movement." 17 As a result, Truman issued a
Presidential Proclamation that suspended MFN treatment to all
parts of Vietnam under communist control; namely, northern
Vietnam. 18 This exclusionary rule remained in the form of a
regulation until 1962, with the passage of the Tariff Schedules of
the United States. This regulation contained a list of countries,
19
including Vietnam, that were denied MFN trading status.
In 1964, at the outset of the Vietnam Conflict, the United
States imposed a trade embargo upon North Vietnam. 20 By the

end of the war, all U.S. economic and diplomatic relations with
Vietnam had ended, and the United States applied the same trade
restrictions to communist South Vietnam, as had previously been
Moreover, the 1974 Act
prescribed to North Vietnam. 2 1
deny non-discriminatory
power
to
maintained the presidential
treatment to any country to which the United States had not
previously granted MFN trading status. 22 Thus, Vietnam began a
commercial battle with the United States for economic
normalization.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Vietnam made little progress in
promoting trade with the United States. Vietnam attempted to
establish diplomatic relations with the United States under the
1973 Paris Peace Agreement. 2 3 President Ford, however, refused
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 50-141, 65 Stat.
17.
73 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1362), repealed by Act of Oct. 11, 1962,
ch. 6. § 257(e)(1), 76 Stat. 882.
18.
Proclamation No. 2935, 16 Fed. Reg. 7635 (1951).
PREGELJ, supra note 5. at CRS-17.
19.
Thomas R. Stauch. The United States and Vietnam: Overcoming the
20.
Pastand Investing In the Future,28 INT'L LAW. 995, 996 (1994).
PREGELJ, supra note 5, at CRS-17. Under the 1962 Tariff Schedule,
21.
the suspension of South Vietnam's MFN status occurred automatically after its
takeover by the Communist North. Id.
22.
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2431 (1980).
23.
The Paris Peace Agreement, signed by Vietnam and the U.S. on
January 27, 1973, marked the end of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.
George Esper, 60,000 Unfulfilled Dreams; No Winners or Losers, Only Victims, AP,
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to negotiate until Vietnam provided a full accounting of U.S.
POWs and MIAs of the Vietnam War. 2 4 In contrast, President
Jimmy Carter initiated steps toward economic normalization with
Vietnam. 2 5
The Carter Administration ceased such efforts,
however, when Vietnam refused to provide information on

prisoners of the Vietnam war unless the U.S. pledged several
billions of dollars in aid for post-war reconstruction. 2 6 Other
obstructions to diplomatic normalization during the Carter era
included both Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and its military
27
alignment with the Soviet Union.
Because President Reagan refused to consider normalizing
relations with Vietnam until it withdrew from Cambodia, Vietnam
made little progress in its economic negotiations with the United
States during the 1980s. 28 It was not until 1991, a year after
Vietnam negotiated a peace settlement with Cambodia, that the
United States considered Vietnam's economic normalization. 29 In
April of 1991, President Bush presented Vietnamese officials with

a four-phase "roadmap," outlining the steps for normalizing
relations with the United States. 30 The proposed agenda required
Vietnam to account for the remaining U.S. soldiers lost during the
Vietnam War and to participate in establishing peace in

Cambodia. 3 1

In return, the United States agreed to expand

32
relations between the two countries.

Feb. 4, 1994, available In LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. After signing the
peace agreement, Vietnam sought talks with the United States to establish
diplomatic relations between the two countries and demanded that the United
States fulfill its duties under the Paris Peace Agreement by providing aid to
Vietnam for post-war reconstruction. PREGELJ, supra note 5, at CRS-3.
24.
This is an issue of importance that has frequently delayed the
prospects of a bilateral trade agreement. PREGELJ, supra note 5, at CRS-3,
25.
In an attempt to establish diplomatic ties, President Carter sent a
commission to Vietnam in 1977 to discuss matters of mutual interest to the two
countries and subsequently agreed to end the U.S. veto of Vietnam's application
for membership in the United Nations. Id. See also Talks Between Vietnamese
Delegation & U.S. PresidentialCommission Concluded, Xinhua News Agency, Mar.
20, 1977, available In LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
26.
PREOELJ, supra note 5, at CRS-3.
27.
Id. at CRS-4.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. at CRS-4 to CRS-5.
30.
Id. at CRS-5.
31.
Id.
32.
ROBERT G. SUTTER, VIETNAM-U.S. RELATIONS:
THE DEBATE OVER
NORMALIZATION, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. IB93081, CRS-14
(Nov. 8, 1995). hi Phase I, Bush's roadmap directed Vietnam to sign a peace
accord with Cambodia and aid in the resolution of U.S. POW and MIAs in
exchange for bilateral talks on diplomatic and economic normalization with the
United States. The second phase mandated Vietnam's continued assistance in
both Cambodia's peace accord and the U.S. POW and MIA issues while the United
States promised to renew communication systems in Vietnam, allow the United
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With the signing of the Cambodian peace accord, and the
visible progress made by Vietnam to resolve POW discrepancy
cases 33 and other MIA issues, the United States maintained its
pact, moving closer to political and economic normalization with
Vietnam. Pursuant to Phase II of the roadmap, President Bush
provided
humanitarian
aid
to
Vietnam,
restored
telecommunication links between the two countries, and
permitted U.S. commercial sales of basic supplies to Vietnam in
1992. 3 4 President Clinton, having endorsed Bush's strategy for
normalization of U.S. relations with Vietnam, lifted the trade
embargo against Vietnam on February 3, 1994. 35 Subsequently,
on July 11, 1995, Clinton announced the establishment of U.S.
diplomatic relations with Vietnam, thus embarking on Phase IV of
Bush's roadmap to normalization. 36
According to President
Clinton, such a political step would not only aid in securing the
fate and additional remains of U.S. POWs and MIAs, but would
also promote U.S. relations with a peaceful Asia. 37 Secretary of
State
Warren
Christopher,
in
response
to
Clinton's

announcement, opened the U.S. embassy in Hanoi on August 8,
1995.38
These newly-established diplomatic relations with
Vietnam have positioned the United States for the completion
of
39
its political and economic normalization with Vietnam.

III.

THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT:

VIETNAM AND EMIGRATION

In 1972, President Richard Nixon announced that the United
States would negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with the Soviet

States to sign commercial contracts with Vietnam, and send delegations to Hanoi
to negotiate normalizing U.S.-Vietnam relations. In exchange for the resolution of
the last known POW discrepancy case in Vietnam. Phase III required the United
States to fully lift its trade embargo against Vietnam. Finally, Phase IV directed
the United States to establish ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations with
Vietnam and consider granting it MFN trading status. Id. at CRS-14 to CRS-15.
33.
Discrepancy cases are those instances where a U.S. soldier was last
seen alive in Vietnam, but did not return to the United States under Operation
Homecoming and has not yet been identified through any other means. Beth
Castelli, The Lifting of the Trade Embargo Between the United States and Vietnam:
The Loss of a Potential Bargaining Tool or a Means of Fostering Cooperation?, 13
DICK. J. INT'L L. 297. 311 n.120 (1995).
34.
See U.S.-VIETNAM NORMALIZATION, supra note 2, at 1.
35.
U.S. Removes Final Barrier to Vietnam: Republicans Blast Decision to
Extend Diplomatic Relations, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), July 12, 1995. at
Al.
36.
Clinton on Recognition: A Move "to Common Ground," N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 1995, atA8.

37.

Id.

38.
39.

SUTTER, supra note 32, at CRS-10.
See Id. at CRS-15.
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Union. 40 Around that same time, however, the Soviet Union
imposed an exit tax on its citizens attempting to emigrate. 4 1 This
action, directed against the Soviet Union's Jewish community,
sparked a U.S. campaign led by Senator Henry M. Jackson and
Representative Charles Vanik to link a nation's trading status to
its emigration policies.

42

As a result of the congressional outrage

over the Soviet treatment of its Jewish community, the JacksonVanik Amendment to the 1974 Act 43 premised a country's grant
of MFN trading status upon the right of that nation's citizens to
emigrate freely. 4 4 This amendment provides an incentive to
countries to suspend restrictive emigration policies in order to
develop economic relations with the United States. 45 It Is the first

procedural requirement that Vietnam must satisfy before the
United States will grant it MFN status.
According to the 1974 Act, any country's exports that did not

receive MFN status from the United States at the time of the 1974

Act's implementation 46 will not be eligible for MFN treatment if
that country:
(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate: (2)
imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or
other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause
whatsoever; or (3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee
the desire of
or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of
47
such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.

40.
Robert H. Brumley, Jackson-Vanilk Hard Fact, Bad Law?, 8 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 363, 365 (1990).
Id. The Soviet Union first launched its vicious campaign against Its
41.
Jewish inhabitants after Israel won the Six Day War in 1967 which had led to the
weakening of Soviet influence in the Arab community. Lara Iglitzin, Jerusalem
Conference Honors the Late Senator Jackson, SEATTLE POST, Feb. 5, 1995, at P1;
Geoffrey Wigoder, Aftermath of Battle, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 19, 1990, available In
LEXIS, News Library, JPOST File. The Soviet retaliation culminated in the
imposition of high taxes upon Soviet Jews attempting to emigrate, the
imprisonment of Jewish citizens for learning Hebrew, and the frequent
interrogation of Jews by Soviet police. See Iglitzin, supra.
Brumley, supranote 40, at 365.
42.
43.
19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1980).
Richard Lawrence, Is Jackson-Vanlk Still Needed?, J. COM. & COM.,
44.
June 24, 1993, at 8A; W. John Moore, The Alumni Lobby, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9.
1989, at 2188, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
S. REP. NO. 1298 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7338.
45.
46.
19 U.S.C. § 2431. Non-market economies to which the United States
had not granted MFN trading status at the time Congress passed the 1974 Act
included Albania, People's Republic of China, Cuba, North Korea, the former
Soviet Union, and Vietnam. U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 45, at 7333.
19 U.S.C. § 2432(a). Although no certification is necessary under the
47.
Jackson-Vanik Amendment regarding the cooperation of Vietnam on U.S. POW
and MIA issues, the President could determine, under Section 403 of the 1974
Act, that Vietnam has failed to cooperate with the United States to achieve a
complete accounting of MIAs, to return remains, or to repatriate personnel who
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In addition, under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974

Act, any country that denies its citizens the freedom to emigrate

will be excluded from U.S. programs extending credit to countries
Similarly, no commercial
for the promotion of free trade. 4 8
agreement may be concluded between the United States and a

policies unless the terms
country with such restrictive emigration
49

of the amendment have been met.
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment provides the President with
two alternatives to end the mandated restrictions and grant MFN
First, the
status to countries disqualified by the 1974 Act.
President may determine that the subject country is no longer in
violation of the emigration restraints specified by the 1974 Act. 5 0
In compliance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the President
must submit a report to Congress outlining the emigration laws
and policies of the country at issue, and demonstrate that any
emigration restrictions previously imposed upon that country's
are still alive. The consequences of such a finding could result in the denial of
nondiscriminatory treatment. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2333 (1980). No
such determination has been made under this provision with regard to Vietnam.
and the recent forward movement in U.S.-Vietnam relations has been attributed
to the progress made by that country toward resolving the POW and MIA issues.
U.S.-VIETNAM NORMALIZATION, supra note 2, at 8. For this reason, it is extremely
unlikely that President Clinton will utilize Section 403 of the Act and bar Vietnam
from receiving MFN treatment based upon the remaining, unresolved MIA cases.
48.
19 U.S.C. § 2432(a). The U.S. credit facilities affected by the JacksonVanik Amendment include those of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) and the Export-Import Bank. OPIC is a self-sustaining government agency
that promotes private, U.S. investment in some 120 less developed countries.
Rob Garverick, OPIC Supports U.S. Investors in LDCs & Emerging Democracies,
Bus. AM., Oct. 7, 1991, at 14. This organization's contributions to U.S. investors
often prove crucial to emerging economies who seek U.S. capital to gain the
strength necessary to compete in the global market. For a complete overview of
OPIC and its benefits to developing nations, see S. Linn Williams, Political & Other
Risk Insurance: Eximbank, OPIC and Miga; Part I: OPIC Insurance, MIDDLE E.
ExEcuTivE REP., Feb. 1988, at 8. Likewise, noncompliance with the JacksonVanik Amendment may prevent a developing country from benefiting from the
services offered by the Export-Import Bank which provides export insurance,
loans, and credit guarantees to U.S. businesses that export to emerging
economies. See James R. Kraus, Ex-Im Bank Shifts Its Focus to Smaller Players,
AM. BANKER, Feb. 22, 1994, at 6 (indicating Bank's aim to boost exports by small
and medium-sized U.S. companies to developing countries).
19 U.S.C. § 2432(a). Although the United States has a strong interest
49.
In promoting human rights in Vietnam, one must note that the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment links only a country's emigration policy to Its ability to obtain MFN
treatment. An acceptable human rights policy is not a statutory element of such
a grant. Lord Says No Linkage In Vietnam Between Trade and Human Rights, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 65, 65 (Jan. 17, 1996).
50.
19 U.S.C. § 2432(b). Past Presidents have made such determinations
with regard to Bulgaria, see Memorandum on Trade with Bulgaria, 29 WEEKLY
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1025 (June 3, 1993), and the Czech and Slovak Republic, see
Memorandum on the Emigration Policies of Czech and Slovak Federal Republics,
27 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1455 (Oct. 16, 1991).
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citizens have been lifted. 5 1 Alternatively, the President may Issue
an executive order thereby waiving the application of the 1974
Act, with respect to any country in violation of the statute, so long
as the President reports to Congress that the waiver will
"substantially" promote the objectives of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment. 2
To waive compliance with the 1974 Act, the
President must also receive assurances from the subject country
that its emigration practices will promote the fundamental human
rights of its citizens.5 3 Such a presidential waiver extends for a
twelve-month term, whereafter further extensions may be made
5 4
for successive twelve-month periods.
A. PresidentialEmigrationCertiflcation
If the U.S. President submits a report to Congress indicating
that a country provides its citizens with the right to emigrate,
refuses to charge a substantial tax on documents required for
emigration, or does not to levy a fee on any citizen desiring to
emigrate, the exports of that country may be eligible to receive
MFN treatment.5 5 Following such executive action, the President
may conclude a bilateral trade agreement with the subject
country and offer it the benefits that accompany the
nondiscriminatory treatment of its exports. 56
Consequently,
President Clinton could grant MFN status to Vietnam if he
determines that its emigration policies coincide with the goals of
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.

Given Vietnam's current emigration practices, however, such
a determination is unlikely. In 1983, over 60,000 Vietnamese
political prisoners remained in "re-education camps," without
hope for a fair trial, and residents were prohibited from traveling
or moving, let alone emigrating, without the permission of the
government.5 7 Although the rights of Vietnamese citizens have
51.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2432(b).
52.
See 19 U.S.C. § 2432(c)(2)(b).
Past Presidential waivers of the
Jackson-Vanik emigration requirements include those of President Clinton for
China, see China: Most-Favored-Nation Status, DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, (U.S.

Dep't of State), June 14, 1993. available in LEXIS, Exec Library, DSTATE File, and
of President Reagan for Romania, see Trade with Romania, Hungary, & China, 23
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 624 (June 2, 1987).

53.
19 U.S.C. § 2432(c)(2).
54.
19 U.S.C. § 2432(d) (Supp. 1996).
55.
19 U.S.C. § 2432(b).
56.
Id.
57.
Human Wrongs, TIME, Feb. 21, 1983, at 18, 18. As late as April of
1983, years after the close of the Vietnam War with the United States, the
Vietnamese government maintained eight re-education camps where South
Vietnam supporters remained for political "rehabilitation." James Kelly, When
Will the Peace Begin?,TIME, Apr. 25, 1983, at 82, 83.
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improved since 1983, the current restrictions on emigration
prevent President Clinton from demonstrating Vietnam's
compliance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
By 1995, Vietnam had granted most of its citizens the ability
58
Although the
to travel within the country with few restrictions.

Vietnamese must seek permission from the government to
lawfully change residence, few restraints on internal travel are
enforced, and citizens no longer need government-issued permits
Foreigners also enjoy free
to cross provincial boundaries.5 9
access to most areas of Vietnam other than border areas, certain
60
There have
islands, and specific areas in the central highlands.
been, however, reports of certain ethnic minorities being forced to
61
acquire permission to travel outside of their particular domains.
Though the Vietnamese government has begun granting more

exit visas, it still maintains a selective process that denies some

citizens the right to travel abroad.6 2 For example, Hanoi granted
Dinh Thu Huong, an eminent dissident writer and citizen of
Vietnam, the ability to leave the country for a European
conference, but denied members of Vietnam's Muslim community
63
the right to leave Vietnam to make a religious journey.
Similarly, Vietnam permits some categories of citizens to emigrate
Vietnam Human Rights Practices, DEP'T STATE DISPATCH (U.S. Dep't of
58.
State). Mar. 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File at *9.
Id.
59.
Id. Entry to Vietnam, however, is not without its limitations. For
60.
example, the Vietnamese government limited the number of travel visas granted
to foreigners in June of 1996 in preparation for the 8th Communist Party
Congress, the most important political even in Vietnam for the year. Vietnam
Restricting Visitor's Entry, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 6, 1996, at Al, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
Vietnam Human Rights Practices, supra note 58. For example, in an
61.
control the Vietnamese Catholic Church and prohibit the spread of
to
attempt
Catholicism, the Vietnamese government declared in March of 1994 that Catholic
bishops and priests could travel freely only within their diocese, while severely
restricting movement outside of these areas. Human Rights Watch: Asia, Federal
News Service, Testimony by Dinah Pokempner Before the House Committee on
International Relations, July 27, 1995.
Vietnam Human Rights Practices, supra note 58, at *10. The right of
62.
Vietnamese citizens to travel abroad will gain in importance as its economic
position in the global market strengthens and its business community begins to
negotiate with investors outside of Vietnam. See Richard Fisher, Mission with
Messages to Deliver. WASH. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1995, at A20.
Vietnam Human Rights Practices, DEP'T STATE DISPATCH, (U.S. Dep't of
63.
State), Mar. 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Though the

Vietnamese government claims to promote freedom of religion, see Communist
Party Newspaper Says Freedom of Religion Observed, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Sept. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File,
religious persecution is widespread and even U.S. tourists have been arrested and
interrogated for evangelizing to Vietnamese citizens. See Religious Freedom and
Persecution of Christians, (FDCH) Fed. Dep't & Agency Doc., Feb. 15. 1996,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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as part of the U.S. Orderly Departure Program, but denies certain
64
ethnic groups access to this program.
After signing a memorandum of understanding with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1989, Vietnam
has increasingly admitted citizens who fled its borders during the
Vietnam War and thereafter. 65
Vietnam agreed to forego
prosecution and other punitive actions against its citizens who
illegally departed and subsequently returned under this voluntary
repatriation program. 66 Since this U.N. agreement, over 72,000
Vietnamese citizens have returned to their homeland without
67
government retribution or official discrimination.

Vietnam's emigration policies have substantially improved
since the Vietnam war. President Clinton, however, will not likely
conclude or report to Congress that Vietnam has satisfied the
emigration requirements listed in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
Though Vietnam imposes no tax on its citizens desiring to leave
the country, it limits those that may emigrate while
discriminating against certain ethnic groups. In November of
1995, President Clinton sent an inter-agency fact-finding
delegation to Vietnam to determine, among other things, its
current emigration restrictions. 68 The committee's conclusions
will determine Clinton's next step in his pursuit to grant MFN
treatment to Vietnam. Because of Vietnam's current emigration
policies, however, Clinton will likely waive the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment restrictions for Vietnam in hopes of convincing
Congress that such a waiver will enhance Vietnam's increasingly
liberal emigration practices.
64.
Vietnam Human Rights Practices, supra note 58. at *10. The Orderly
Departure Program (ODP) was created in 1979 by a group of nations seeking to
end the dangerous and often fatal attempt of Vietnamese "boat people" to defect
from their country. See Robert Funseth, A Safe Exodus from Vietnam, CHI. TRIB.,
July 6, 1986, at 2. Today, the ODP provides a safe and legal means of departure
to those Vietnamese residents who have been classified as Vietnamese
immigrants and public interest parolees, refugees, or Amerasian immigrants.
FactSheet- U.S. Expands Orderly Departurefor Vietnamese Refugees, U.S. Dep't of
State Dispatch, 1991 WL 2847679, Apr. 1, 1991.
65.
Vietnam Human Rights Practices,supra note 58, at *10.
66.
Id. See, e.g., Hong Kong Begins Deporting Vietnamese, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
12, 1989, at 20. Vietnam's promises, however, often fall to deaf ears as many
Vietnamese emigrants, who would rather live in transit camps than return home,
refuse to voluntarily repatriate. In fact, the fear of forced repatriation has encited

threats of suicide and actual violence in many such camps.

See Vietnamese

Refugees in Malaysia Threaten Suicide !f Forcibly Repatriated, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File, June 29,
1992; Ismail Kassim, Twenty Detained over Refugee Protest, STRAITS TIMES
(Singapore), June 7, 1995 availablein 1995 WL 8537078.

67.
68.

Vietnam Human Rights Practices,supranote 58, at *10.
Lake Meets POW-MA Representatives on Relations with Vietnam, U.S.

Newswire, Nov. 7, 1995. available In 1995 WL 11282682.
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B. PresidentialWaiver
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment authorizes the President to
waive, by executive order, the emigration requirements of the
1974 Act, if doing so will promote free emigration among its

trading partners.6 9

To make the initial waiver, the President

must report to Congress that "he has determined that such
waiver will substantially promote the objectives of [the JacksonVanik Amendment]; and he has received assurances that the
emigration practices of that country will henceforth lead
substantially to the achievement of the objectives of [the JacksonVanik Amendment]. ''70
Thus, to waive the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment
emigration
requirements
for Vietnam
and,
consequently, grant MFN trading status to that country, President
Clinton must demonstrate to Congress that establishing
nondiscriminatory trading status with Vietnam will hasten
improved emigration policies. Furthermore, Clinton must show
that Vietnam would reform its current emigration policy to be
consistent with the objectives of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
Examining past presidential waivers of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment requirements suggests that the President will be
influenced more by the United States pursuit of free trade and
economic prosperity than by Vietnam's emigration policies. In
1982, President Reagan waived Romania's compliance with the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment based primarily upon the waiver's
"important means for the strengthening of mutually beneficial
and Romania. 7 1
the United States
relations" between
Nevertheless, President Reagan did voice his concern about the
emigration policies of Romania, suggesting in the same
congressional address that MFN status for Romania should be
reconsidered in the future if it did not improve "its repressive
emigration procedure and its significant decrease in Romanian
Jewish emigration to Israel."72 Similarly, in 1990, President Bush
invoked his authority under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to
waive emigration requirements applicable to the former Soviet

Union,73 even though that nation had not adopted a liberal

69.

Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1980).

70.
Id. The President's initial waiver requires no congressional approval,
nor Is it subject to a congressional objection. PREGELJ, supra note 5, at CRS-18.
71.
Trade with Romania, Hungary, and the People's Republic of China,
President's Message to Congress, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 740 (June 2,
1982).
72.
Id.
73.
White House Fact Sheet on the Waiver of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2023 (Dec. 12, 1990).
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emigration law.' 4 President Bush, in an effort to help Mikhail
Gorbachev, considered the waiver in light of the economic
opportunities for U.S. farmers to sell grain to the former Soviet
75
Union, which faced severe food shortages at that time.
According to U.S. officials, even though the Soviet Union did not

permit its citizens to travel freely outside of its borders,
emigration rules in practice had changed dramatically from 1974,
when the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was first enforced, to 1990,
when the President first considered a waiver for the former Soviet
76
Union.
Like the administrations before him, President Clinton may
stress the economic benefits of free trade with Vietnam and
deemphasize the established, but sometimes unenforced, 7 7
emigration rules of that country. According to a U.S. official, who
accompanied Secretary of State Warren Christopher on a trip to
Hanoi, "At the beginning of [the Clinton Administration], there
were two key goals of U.S. foreign policy: promoting trade and
promoting human rights . . . . Unfortunately, one goal often

completely contradicted the other." 78 Many U.S. officials seek to

avoid political disagreements at the cost of economic gain for U.S.
79
businesses.

Granting MFN status to Vietnam promises economic and
political benefits for both the United States and Vietnam. The
United States stands to gain a new market of over 70,000,000
consumers,8 0 while creating an atmosphere that could better
foster investigations into the remaining POW and MIAs of the
Vietnam War. 8 1
Likewise, Vietnam stands to gain U.S.
technology, management expertise, and capital,8 2 while becoming
a significant exporter of textile and apparel products to the United
States. 83 President Clinton will likely grant Vietnam a waiver

74.

Robert C. Toth, Bush Considers Waiving Curbsfor Soviet Grain Sale,

L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1990, at Al.
75.
Id. at A12.
76.
Id.
77.
See supra text accompanying notes 50-60.
78.
Michael Dobbs. American Trade Policies Showing Less Concern with
Human Rights in Asia, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1995, at A12.
79.
Id.
80.
Llewellyn D. Howell, AmerAsla's Future is Now, USA TODAY (Mag.), Mar.
1. 1994, at 69, available in 1994 WL 13637822.
81.
Human Rights in Vietnam: Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Kent Wedemann Before the Comm. on Int'l Relations, Nov. 8, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 11869416.
82.
U.S. Vietnam Relations - Issues and Implications, GOA Reports (FDCH),
Apr. 14, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
83.
U.S.-VIETNAM NORMALIZATION, supranote 2, at 9.
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Jackson-Vanik Amendment because of these economic
under the
84
benefits.
To comply with the 1974 Act, President Clinton must report
to Congress that waiving the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
requirements will substantially promote more liberal emigration
policies in Vietnam. 85 Although such a waiver will not constitute
a conveyance of MFN status to Vietnam, it will further symbolize
U.S. commitment to achieving that end. In an attempt to receive
such an economically valuable status, Vietnam will likely comply
with many U.S. demands on its emigration policies. For example,
at the direction of the United States, Vietnam recently released
two U.S. political prisoners, who had been detained since 1993.86
Likewise, Vietnam has begun to allow the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees to monitor its treatment of repatriates
Such cooperation
through direct visits to Vietnam. 8 7
as it enters the
reform
to
willingness
Vietnam's
demonstrates
Amendment
Jackson-Vanik
of
the
A
waiver
market.
global
requirements would provide the United States with even greater
leverage to promote social changes in Vietnam.8 8 Likewise, in
anticipation of a nondiscriminatory trade agreement with the
United States, Vietnam will likely fulfil its requirements under
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment by assuring President Clinton
that it will continue to work toward the free emigration of its
citizens.
The successful waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
requirements represents the first step toward Vietnam's grant of
Though a Congressionally-approved bilateral
MFN status.
agreement must follow before Vietnam will be granted MFN
treatment, a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment would
make Vietnam immediately eligible to participate in U.S.
programs extending credit and investment guarantees to foreign
Likewise, U.S. trade assistance will open
nations. 8 9
communications between the two countries and increase the
likelihood of a bilateral trade agreement in the future.

See supra text accompanying notes 50-57.
84.
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432(c)(2) (1980).
85.
HumanRights in Vietnam, supra note 81, at *7.
86.
Vietnam Human Rights Practices,supra note 59, at *10.
87.
88.
Vietnamese officials are anxious to benefit from a trade agreement with
the United States and are welcoming U.S. products into their country. To foster
this process, the Vietnamese government has indicated that it will discuss human
rights issues with the United States, even though these concepts differ
U.S. Vietnam Relations - Issues and
dramatically within the two cultures.
Implications, supra note 82.
See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1980); White House Fact
89.
Sheet on the Waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 2023 (Dec. 12, 1990).
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IV. COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT

Before the United States can grant MFN status to Vietnam, it
must enter a comprehensive trade agreement with Vietnam
providing for reciprocal grants of nondiscriminatory treatment. 90
According to the 1974 Act, the President may authorize a bilateral
commercial agreement only after the determination that such an
agreement is in the best interest of the United States. 9 1 The
agreement must then be approved by a joint resolution of
Congress 92 and limited to an initial period of no more than three
years from the date of enforcement. 9 3 Thereafter, the agreement
may be renewed by the President, for three-year periods, after a
determination that a balance of concessions in trade has been
maintained over the life of the agreement, and that reductions in
U.S. tariffs and other barriers to trade have been reciprocated by
the other country. 9 4 In this manner, the 1974 Act provides for
periodic reviews of the agreement to ensure that any country
negotiating with the U.S. offers reasonably comparable trade
benefits without merely receiving a "free ride."9 5
The United States and Vietnam will likely enter a trade
agreement similar in form to those that the United States has
96
negotiated with current and former Communist governments.
U.S. officials have indicated that more specificity will be employed
in an agreement with Vietnam than has been used in such
agreements in the past. 9 7 In addition, the 1974 Act identifies
certain terms of the agreement that the United States must
include in its bilateral trade negotiations with countries seeking

90.
Brenda A. Jacobs, For Vietnam, Economic Normalcy Trails Diplomacy
and Politics, 37 BOBBIN, Oct. 1. 1995. availablein 1995 WL 12115260.
91.
19 U.S.C. § 2435(a) (1980). Such a presidential determination will
likely be rendered easily considering the economic benefits that a bilateral trade
agreement may reap for U.S. businesses if Vietnam is granted MFN treatment.
92.
19 U.S.C. § 2435(c). Congressional cooperation will likely pose a
challenge for Vietnam as it works toward MFN trading status with the United
States. See Infra VA.
93.
19 U.S.C. § 2435 (b)(1).
94.
Id.
Factors that will be considered when reviewing Vietnam's
cooperation with the United States in its trade relations include the
implementation of non-tariff barriers, the success of a state-to-state trade
agreement, the balance of market access opportunities, and reciprocal reductions
in constraints on trade. See generally Agreement on Trade Relations Between the
United States of America and the Government of the Czechoslovak Federate
Republic, Sept. 12, 1990, available in 1990 WL 385123 (demonstrating the major
concerns of the United States when attempting to maintain a reciprocal trade

agreement with a foreign nation).
95.
96.
97.

U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 45, at 7340.
Jacobs, supra note 90.
U.S.-VETNAM NORMALIZATION, supra note 2, at 9.
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nondiscriminatory trading status. 9 8 The first of these terms
specifies the duration of the agreement, enabling the United

States to examine the balance of concessions between the

The
contracting parties over the life of the agreement. 9 9
remaining nine terms include provisions for: termination due to
security reasons, safeguards against market disruption,
protection of patents, trademarks, and industrial property of U.S.
businesses, and arbitration of commercial differences and
disputes.1 0 0 These terms, and many others, represent issues that
the United States must negotiate and settle with Vietnam before
granting Vietnam MFN status.
A. ProtectingNational Security

A bilateral commercial agreement with Vietnam must provide
that it "is subject to suspension or termination at any time for
national security reasons."'1 1 According to the 1974 Act, such a
provision is paramount when negotiating with Communist
governments.10 2 Grounds for terminating trade concessions and
credits to partner countries include circumstances where the
trading partner encourages aggression against the United States
or where it cuts off a supply of vital U.S. imports that are
necessary for a stable U.S. economy. 10 3 Although the dynamics
of the global community have changed greatly since the
enactment of the 1974 Act, the inclusion of a national security
provision in a trade agreement with Vietnam represents routine
U.S. procedure and, as such, will not create much room for
negotiation. Such a provision will likely resemble that of the 1990

trade agreement between the United States and the former Soviet
for
Union, which represents a typical U.S. contract providing
nondiscriminatory treatment with a Communist country. 10 4 The
stipulation will likely read that "[tihe provisions of this Agreement
shall not limit the right of either Party to take any action for the

98.
99.

19 U.S.C. § 2435(b).
Id.

100.

Id.

101.
102.

19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(2).
U.S.C.C.A.N.. supra note 45, at 7340.

103.

Id.

104. Throughout the Legislative History of the 1974 Act, the drafters refer to
the 1972 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement as a model for future commercial

agreements with Communist countries. Since that time, the agreement between
the United States and the U.S.S.R. has been frequently updated until the fall of
the Soviet Union. For this reason, the 1990 trade agreement will be employed
between these two countries throughout the Note as a model of the standard
commercial agreement employed by the United States in such negotiations.
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protection of its security interests." 0 5 In this manner, the
contracting parties may initiate strategic military maneuvers,
including those affecting trade, without disrupting the preexisting
bilateral trade agreement.
B. Preventing Market Disruption
According to the 1974 Act, a bilateral trade agreement with
Vietnam must include a provision protecting U.S. industries from
market disruption. 0 6 This contractual term, which is customary
in U.S. bilateral trade agreements, prevents imports of a specific
product from increasing in quantity so quickly that they cause a
material injury to competing domestic industries.1 0 7 The 1974
Act requires safeguarding arrangements that provide for
immediate negotiations when a market disruption is threatened,
and which grant the authority to both countries to impose
temporary trade restrictions. 10 8
A typical provision includes
prompt consultation at the request of either party to examine the
factors relating to the imports that create a market disruption
and to determine the appropriate means of remedying the
economic threat. l0 9
Vietnam's agreement with the United States will likely specify
reasonable protective measures, such as import limitations and
tariffs, that either party may employ to end a market
disruption. 110 At the same time, the agreement will likely give
each trading partner the right, in the event the other party
deviates from its obligations under the agreement, to itself deviate
to that same degree. 1 1' Similar to a provision terminating the
obligations of the trade contract for purposes of national security,
this clause protects both parties to the agreement and will not

likely be the subject of intense negotiations between the United
States and Vietnam.

105. Agreement on Trade Relations. June 1. 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XIII,
29 I.L.M. 946, 959.
106. 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(3).
107. The 1990 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement defines a market disruption
as a circumstance where "imports of an article, like or directly competitive with an
article produced by such domestic industry, are increasing rapidly, either
absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat
thereof, to such domestic industry." Agreement on Trade Relations. supra note
105, art. XI. at 957.
108. 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(3).
109. Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 105, art. XI,at 957-58.
110. See Id.
111. Id.
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C. Preserving U.S. Patents and Trademarks
Under the 1974 Act, if the party to a U.S. bilateral trade
agreement is not a member of the Paris Convention for the

Protection of Industrial Property (hereinafter Paris Convention),"

2

the trade agreement must provide specific rights for U.S.
businesses and investors with respect to patents and
trademarks. 113 In this manner, U.S.-based industries can expect
the same protection afforded their patents and trademarks by the
Paris Convention parties." 4 Although Vietnam is a member of
the Paris Convention, as well as the Arrangement of Madrid
concerning the International Registration of Marks (hereinafter
l6
Madrid Agreement),' 1 5 an off-shoot of the Paris Convention,"
foreign trademarks are increasingly targeted for counterfeiting in
Vietnam.' 17 Moreover, the United States is not a member of the
Madrid Agreement, and U.S. companies may not avail themselves
of such international registration." 8 As a result, U.S. businesses
must register their trademarks and patents individually in
Vietnam." 19 For this reason, Vietnam must enforce its trademark
and patent laws before a trade agreement with the United States
can be negotiated.
Vietnam maintains a "first-to-file" rule for obtaining
trademark rights. 120 For this reason, the most reliable method

112. The Paris Convention established the basic principles of an
international patent regime by emphasizing certain core rules, common among its
member countries, governing unfair competition, application, registration, and
duration of patents and trademarks. Michael A. Epstein, Intellectual Property:
Eye on EasternEurope Treatise, Local Law Map Course For Enforcement, N.Y.L.J.,
May 23. 1994, at S4, S14.
113. 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(4).
114. U.S.C.C.A.N., supranote 45, at 7341.
115. The Madrid Agreement encompasses the general principles advocated
by the Paris Agreement while going a step further to provide a single registration
for trademark protection in its 43 member countries. Ian Jay Kaufman, NonEuropean View of Madrid Protocol, Trademark Law Treaty & Community Trade
Mark, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 18, 1995, at 5. Under the Madrid Agreement, any individual
or legal entity who has a mark registered in his domicile or country of origin may
receive protection for that mark by filing a single application, having a duration of
20 years, with the Central Registration Bureau located in Geneva, Switzerland.
Ian Jay Kaufman, The Madrid Protoco: Should the U.S. Join?, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9.
1992, at 5. 27.
116. Frederick Burke, Trademark Protection in Vietnam, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE
REP., Oct. 15, 1991, at 8.
117. Id.
118. What U.S. Companies Need to Know About Intellectual PropertyProtection
In Vietnam, Bus. AM., Oct. 5, 1992, at 22.
119. Burke, supranote 116, at 21.
120. Id. The first-to-file system represents an improvement from Vietnam's
former "first-to-use" system of trademark protection, but problems continue to
abound as pirates beat manufacturers to the trademark office. Murray Hiebert,
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for obtaining trademark registration in Vietnam is to apply with
the National Office of Inventions (NOI)' 2 1 for a trademark license
before any conflicting registration is filed. 1 22
Frequently,
however, trademark pirates file local applications with the NOI for
12 3
registration of trademarks that belong to foreign companies.
Additionally, even though filing a trademark with the NOI confers
exclusive rights to the registrant, well-known marks are often

pirated.' 24

In such circumstances, the actual owner of the

trademark has several recourses, the most effective
of which Is to
125
take informal actions to resolve the problem.
In the past, Vietnam's first-to-file trademark policy and
ineffectual judicial system has fostered a lucrative business 126
in
counterfeiting foreign trademarks for the domestic market.
Vietnam has realized, however, that in order to attract foreign
investors and participate in world trade, it must protect
intellectual property rights. 12 7 As a result, the NOI has become
more efficient and organized, issuing orders to terminate the
infringement of registered trademarks within two to three months

On Your Marks: Only the Quick Win Under Hanoi's Trademark Rules, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Apr. 15, 1993, at 65.
121. The NOI, which reports to the State Committee for Science and
Technology (which in turn reports to Vietnam's Council of Ministers), is charged
with the administration of intellectual property law in Vietnam. James Taylor.
Jr., Vietnam: the CurrentLegal Environmentfor U.S. Investors, 25 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 469, 476 (1994).
122. Burke, supra note 116, at 21. A well-advised foreign manufacturer or
producer will take steps to register its trademarks in Vietnam before launching its
products in the Vietnamese market. In this manner, U.S. businesses may avoid
the problems which arise when registering a trademark after a pirate has beaten
a rightful trademark owner to the NOI, for adequate trademark protection begins
with proper registration. Michael J. Scown, Bucking the Wiles of Vietnam's Pirates,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1993, at 6. availableIn 1993 WL-WSJA 2056436.
123. See What U.S. Companies Need to Know About Intellectual Property
Protection In Vietnam, supra note 118, at 22.
124. Id.
125. Burke, supra note 116, at 25. Depending upon the type of trademark
application which one completes, Vietnamese law may permit an applicant to
oppose or contest a previously filed application Judicially or informally. Taylor,
supra note 121, at 476.

126.

See What U.S. Companies Need to Know About Intellectual Property

Protection in Vietnam, supra note 118, at 22. Rampant pirating in Vietnam also
may be attributed to that country's long isolation from the global market. As a
result, its residents' hunger for foreign goods fuels the success of those
counterfeit products that imitate Western technology and emulate Western
culture.
127. Tanya Pullin, Vietnam Is Not a Copycat, FAR E. ECON. REV.. Jan. 18,
1996, at 28. See also Clark W. Lackert, Worldwide Focus Is Greater Protection,
Harmony: Countries Ease Legal Restrictions, NAT'L L.J.. May 11, 1992, at S10.
("[Vietnam's] leaders regard better trademark protection as necessary for
economic development.").
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In addition, Vietnam's Market
filing. 128
Bureau
or local police will inspect an alleged
Management
infringer's factory and destroy any merchandise that violates a
29
fied trademark. 1
Moreover, the adoption of Vietnam's new Civil Code, 130 which
provides guidelines for the enforcement of trademarks, patents,
and copyrights registered in Vietnam, emphasizes Vietnam's
commitment to improving its business environment for foreign
investors. 13 1 The International Patent, Trademark, and Copyright
Agency (INVENCO) 1 3 2 deals with matters concerning trademarks,
and all trademarks will be protected going forward from the date

of a petitioner's

grants a registration certificate to the
upon which the government
33
trademark owner. 1
Because Vietnam has had little success enforcing its
industrial property regulations in the past, the United States will
likely negotiate a detailed trademark and patent provision in its
bilateral trade agreement with Vietnam. This will occur even
though Vietnam is a party to both the Paris Convention and the

Madrid Agreement. Before entering a trade agreement, the United
States must send delegations to Vietnam to analyze its current
trademark and patent protection policies. Those U.S. delegations
must ensure Vietnam's adherence to its commitments made as a
member of the Paris Convention.'1 4 The United States will also
likely include assurances in the agreement that Vietnam wil
promote the protection of intellectual property rights as outlined
in its Civil Code. It may even premise the agreement upon certain
135
tangible improvements in Vietnam's trademark procedures.
Regardless of the end result, the protection of trademarks and
128. Pullin, supra note 127.
129. Id. The Market Management Bureau is an administrative agency in
Vietnam that adjudicates cases regarding the infringement of intellectual property
laws. See Harish Mehta, Vietnam Lays Down the Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 18, 1992, at 6, available in 1992 WL 10493585.
130. On October 28, 1995, Vietnam's National Assembly enacted that
country's first-ever civil code. This Civil Code explicitly protects intellectual
property that has been registered with proper Vietnamese agencies. Adrian
Edwards, Vietnam Passes Law for Property, Other Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 29,
1995, at A32. Vietnam hopes that the Civil Code, which was designed to
establish a clear and modem body of law, will attract foreign investors and help
the country develop its market economy. Kathy Wilhelm, Legislature Overhauls
Civil Code for Market Economies, AP, Oct. 28, 1995, available in 1995 WL
4412060.
See Le Xuan Thao, Trade Marks in Vietnam, Trade Mark Yearbook, May
131.
31, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
132. Vietnam's newly implemented Civil Code established INVENCO to
administer matters concerning trademark, copyright, and patent regulations. Id.
133. Id.
134.
Pullin, supranote 127.
See Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 105, art. VIII, at 955-56.
135.

798

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:777

patents will prove to be the subject of substantial talks between
Vietnam and the United States, and could feasibly slow the
negotiations of a bilateral trade agreement between the two
countries.
D. Safeguarding Copyrights
The 1974 Act also specifies that the protection of copyrights
must be addressed in a U.S. bilateral trade agreement if the
contracting country is not a party to the Universal Copyright
Convention (UCC). 1 3 6
Governed by the U.N. Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the UCC creates common
copyright rules and standards for member countries, and sets the
minimum protection of a copyright at the life of the author plus
twenty-five years. 137 Such standards could create stumbling
blocks for Vietnam in its negotiations for bilateral trade with the
United States, since Vietnam is not a member of the UCC and has
not established a law that effectively prevents copyright
infringement.
Although the Vietnam National Assembly recently approved

new copyright legislation in October of 1995,138 it is estimated
that thousands of unauthorized copies of audio and video
programs are produced every day in Ho Chi Minh City to be sold
in local Vietnamese stores. 139
As of July, 1996, Vietnam's
copyright law has provided some basic protection for copyrights
registered in Vietnam, but remains deficient in its enforcement
140
provisions and its treatment of foreign rights owners.
Copyrights properly filed with the Vietnamese Ministry of Culture
and Information typically protect a written work for fifty years
after the death of the author; and in the case of a film, video, or
recording, for fifty years after the date of manufacture or first

136.
19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(5)-(6) (1980). The UCC, adopted at Geneva on
September 6, 1952, affords its signatories with international copyright protection
without mandating the relinquishment of certain formality requirements. James
J. Merriman, Note. Battling Motion Picture Piratesin Turbid InternationalWaters, 23
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 623, 627 (1991). Though the UCC obligates its members
to provide effective copyright protection, it cannot Itself confer any rights, thereby
preventing any real benefit to foreign businesses that operate within its member
nations that have passed individual copyright legislation. Bruce P. Keller, et al.,
NationalLaws Play a Role in InternationalProtection, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1992, at
19, 23.
137.
Epstein, supranote 112, at S14.
138. See supra note 130.
139. Vietnam to Crack Down on Copyright Piracy. Xinhua Eng. Newswire.
Oct. 20, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11191175.
140.
1994 Vietnamese Ordinance on Copyright. A Summary of Key Points,
Music & COPYRIGHT, July 5. 1995, at 11, available in 1995 WL 10232432.
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broadcasting. 14 1 Vietnamese law only creates copyright privileges
for foreign authors if their works are published in Vietnam within
thirty days of their first publication in the author's country or by
reciprocal agreements between Vietnam and other participating
nations. 142 Presently, however, Vietnam is not a member of any
14 3
major copyright convention.
Recognizing a need for improvement in its copyright
legislation to attract foreign investors, Vietnam has recently
attempted to crack down on copyright infringement. For example,
in 1995, the Ministry of Culture and Information 14 4 refused to
issue any further permits to Vietnamese publishers to reprint
foreign works unless the Vietnamese publishing house obtained
written permission from the foreign publisher. 145 Additionally,
the United States and Vietnam have begun negotiations for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights in Vietnam that will act
as a precursor to the copyright provision of an eventual trade
46
agreement between the two countries. 1
Vietnamese officials have urged its potential trading partners
for flexibility as it attempts to implement effective copyright
statutes in a poor country where one can earn a substantial
income pirating foreign books and records. 14 7 As a result, the
United States will likely include a comprehensive provision in a
commercial trade agreement with Vietnam that advocates the
standards of the UCC and specifically addresses Vietnamese
enforcement of copyright legislation. Additionally, the United
States may include a requirement that Vietnam enhance its

present copyright law with adherence to the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 14 8 This Convention
141.

Id.

142.
143.

Id.
Id.

144. Vietnam's Ministry of Culture is a governmental agency charged with
the enforcement of copyright law. David Lange, Vietnam's 1994 Ordinance on
Copyright Protection: A Survey and PreliminaryAnalysis, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1. 22
(1995).
145.
Reginald Chua, In Vietnam, Publishing Yields Plenty of Dividends, But
Few Royalties, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL-WSJA
10228211.
146.
Vietnam-US Copyright Agreement Could Be Ready by June. AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 21, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 3842206.
147.
Greg Torode, The InsularDays of Embargoes Are a Thing of the Pastand
Vietnam is FastBecoming a Large Marketfor Countetfelt Goods, S. CHINA MORNING
PosT, Dec. 21, 1994, at 6, availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
148.
See Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 105, at art. VIII. The

Berne Convention, established in 1886 by nine original member countries, is
presently comprised of over 80 nations seeking universal protection for artistic
works produced within their borders. Susan Stanton. Development of the Berne
InternationalCopyright Convention and Implications of United States Adherence, 13
Hous. J. INT'L L. 149 (1990).
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protects literary and artistic works by establishing certain
of any
principles of national copyright treatment, independent
14 9
copyright protection in the work's country of origin.
Regardless of the terms used in the final draft of the bilateral
trade agreement between Vietnam and the United States, Vietnam
must actively enforce its copyright laws before such a contract
can be drafted. Until Vietnam assures U.S. nationals of at least
the same minimum protections afforded by the UCC, the United
States, under the 1974 Act, cannot enter a commercial trade
agreement with Vietnam.
E. Protectionof IndustrialRights and Processes
A commercial trade agreement between the United States and
Vietnam must include a provision that protects "industrial rights
and processes" in addition to U.S. claims to patents, copyrights,
and trademarks. 5 0° This term simply refers to industrial knowhow, as opposed to a patent or trademark, and will likely be
included in the negotiations with Vietnam regarding the
protection of these industrial property rights. Compliance with
the 1974 Act will result in the inclusion of a simple phrase
ensuring that Vietnam will protect industrial property rights such
In this
as inventions, industrial designs, and trade secrets. 5 1

manner, the United States will incorporate the preservation of
U.S. industrial property rights and processes in its negotiations
with Vietnam.
F. Resolving CommercialDifferences and Disputes
According to the 1974 Act, the United States must also
include, in a commercial trade agreement with Vietnam,
"arrangements for the settlement of commercial differences and
disputes."'15 2 Because most commercial contracts resulting from
the trade agreement will be made by U.S. nationals rather than
the government, the 1974 Act does not intend for the agreement
to require a specific and time-consuming method of commercial
dispute resolution.' 5 3 On the contrary, the trade agreement must
include an endorsement by the contracting parties of the
149. Epstein, supra note 112, at S14.
150. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(6) (1980).
151. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 105, art. VIII, at
955 (including the phrase that the United States and the Soviet Union included In
their trade agreement to ensure protection of these industrial property rights).
152. 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(7). See also Dominic Bencivenga, Vietnam on Hold:
Investors Walt for Trade and Legal Developments, N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1995, at 5
(resolving disputes next for Vietnam and investors).
153. U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 45, at 7341.
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"principle of independent dispute-settlement mechanisms"
and a
5 4
covenant that both parties will facilitate such arbitration.'
Vietnam is currently developing an effective arbitration
system to resolve commercial disputes between Vietnamese
Vietnam's Law on Foreign
parties and foreign entities.
Investment, promulgated in 1987,155 mandates that parties to a
foreign investment contract attempt to resolve commercial
If this fails to
disputes through independent negotiation.' 5 6
provide a solution, the parties must refer the dispute either to the
Vietnam International Arbitration Center (hereinafter Center) or
another judicial body stipulated by the contract. 157 Upon filing a
request for arbitration with the Center, a hearing will be

conducted by one or more arbitrators who have previously been
approved by the Center.' 58 After the arbitrator announces the
decision, records are kept summarizing the particulars of the
dispute, the hearing, the decision, and the arbitrator's

reasoning.1 5 9 If, however, parties stipulate to a specific, foreign
judiciary to resolve their commercial disputes, Vietnam will abide

154.

Id. Though such covenants seem to have little enforceable power, the

United States may premise the renewal of its ultimate trade agreement with
Vietnam upon that country's willingness to establish an effective system of
arbitration.
Additionally, these clauses will assure foreign businesses that
Vietnam recognizes the importance of arbitrating commercial disputes between
international investors and its citizens.
155. James S. Finch & Harold P. Fiske, Vietnam's Evolving Arbitration
System, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Apr. 15, 1995, at 9. The Vietnamese National
Assembly enacted the Law on Foreign Investment in December of 1987 to form
the legal foundation for foreign investment in Vietnam. Since that time, however,
additional laws and ordinances have been promulgated in such areas as labor,
banking, and arbitration to provide a more detailed explanation of the
government's intent to foreign investors. Mathilde L. Genovese, Succeeding in
Vietnam's Emerging Market Economy, E. ASIAN ExEc. REP., May 15, 1995, at 7, 22.
156. Taylor, supranote 121, at 478.
157. Id. The Center was established in April of 1993 as a combination of
the State Economic Arbitration Council, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Committee,
and the Maritime Arbitration Committee, each having previously employed
differing rules of arbitration. Though nongovernmental, the Center receives its
funding from Vietnam's Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Finch & Fiske,
See also Douglas Wong, Vietnam "Working on Enforcing
supra note 155.
Arbitration Awards," STRAITS TIMES, July 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, ARCNWS File; ArbitratorSteps in for Judgeless Courts, VIETNAM INV. REV.,
July 25, 1994, at 12.

158.

Finch & Fiske, supra note 155. The Center conducted its first hearing

in 1994. Since that time, new rules have been implemented to facilitate the
adjudication of disputes, including rules governing the location of the hearing and
the subject matter of the dispute. Thai Nhu, FirstArbitration Disputes Settled,
VIETNAM INv. REv., Feb. 21, 1994, at 12.
Finch & Fiske, supra note 155.
159.
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by that forum's decisions as long as the resolution
complies with
0

the fundamental principles of Vietnamese law.16
The major flaw of Vietnam's arbitration system lies in its lack
of enforcement powers. Currently, no formal legal mechanism
exists in Vietnam guaranteeing that parties will receive the
For this
damages awarded by an arbitration proceeding. 16 1
reason, the Center focuses upon attempts to settle disputes at the
arbitration stage and encourages voluntary compliance with
arbitration decisions, rather than upon the legal enforcement of
particular dispute resolutions. 1 62 Although the Center's inability
to enforce decisions undermines its ability to resolve disputes,
Vietnamese officials have indicated that legislation providing

enforcement measures to the Center will likely be enacted In
1996.163 Such an act will fortify Vietnam's arbitration system
while stressing Vietnam's commitment to the establishment of an
effective method for commercial dispute resolution.
Because the 1974 Act only requires that the United States
and Vietnam include a provision supporting the principles of
commercial
dispute resolution in their bilateral
trade
agreement, 1 64 negotiations in this area will be minimal, especially
in light of Vietnam's recent progress in commercial arbitration.
The U.S. trade agreement with Vietnam will likely include
language encouraging Vietnamese entities and U.S. businesses to
include arbitration in the terms of their contract as a means of
settling commercial disputes.' 6 5 Likewise, the trade agreement
will likely recognize the validity of arbitration decisions made
outside of either country under internationally recognized
arbitration standards. Such language, required by the 1974 Act,
represents the position of both the United States and Vietnam,
and will cause little friction between the two countries as they
attempt to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement.

160. Vietnam Okays Foreign Arbitration, Japan Economic Newswire, Sept.
30, 1995. availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
161. Finch & Fiske, supra note 155. Recently, however, Vietnam signed the
New York Convention, which provides that commercial arbitration resolutions
made abroad will be enforceable in Vietnam. Steady Legal Changes Clearing
Investors'Path,VIETNAM INV. REV., Mar. 4, 1996, at 25.
162.
Finch & Fiske, supra note 155. This emphasis of disputed resolution

is best illustrated by examining the number of disputes settled prior to an actual
arbitration proceeding. Since the first 21 hearings at the Ho Chi Minh City office,
17 cases settled prior to the scheduled arbitration action. Id.

163.

Id.

164.
165.

19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(7) (1980).
See Agreement on Trade Relations, supranote 105, art. XII, at 958.
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G. PromotingEffective BilateralTrade
The remaining requirements of the 1974 Act include three
housekeeping provisions for the promotion of bilateral trade. The
agreement must establish the necessary government offices and
trading positions to facilitate trade, provide for regular
consultations between the participating countries to maintain a
cooperative relationship, and include any additional issues that
promote the purposes of the 1974 Act. 1 6 6 These three provisions
are common elements of the commercial agreements between the
United States and its Communist trading partners also. The
provisions ensure that the agreement creates benefits for the
private sector, while enabling the United States to monitor the
trading relationship and make any necessary adjustments to
1 67
promote the interests of its citizens.
Many additional issues exist that cannot be found in the
1974 Act but must be resolved before formal trade negotiations

can begin with Vietnam.

According to a U.S. trade official,

considerable research of Vietnam's trade regime must 1be
68
completed before a trade agreement can be established.
Reports on Vietnamese import tariffs, state licenses for imports
and exports, and permits for individual trade transactions are
among a few of the topics that U.S. officials will investigate before
negotiating with Vietnam. 16 9 Furthermore, because talks with
the Vietnamese government regarding a formal trade agreement
requires Congressional approval, President Clinton is not likely to
push for such negotiations during the 1996 election year. 170 This
mix of factors makes it difficult to predict when negotiations for a
trade agreement with Vietnam will begin.
Until that time,
however, Vietnam should focus on the nine factors listed in the

166.
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(8)-(10).
167.
U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 45, at 7341.
168.
Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Vietnam Set to Begin Talks on Trade Pact in
October, Aide Says. 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), 1615 (1995). available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, INTRAD File.
169.
Id. Vietnam has made recent attempts to improve its position in the
global market by announcing revisions of its import-export regulations and
lowering tariffs to facilitate trade. See Vietnam to Revise Import-Export Rules,
Xinhua Eng. Newswire, Apr. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10075034 and
Vietnam to Cut Tariffs. Platt's Oilgram News, Jan. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8701220. At the same time, however, Vietnam has shown a reluctance to lower
all trade barriers, bringing imports of white and crude sugar to a halt in March of

1996 to stabilize the price of sugar cane harvested in that country. Vietnam
Temporarily Stops Sugar Imports, Raises Tariffs, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1996,
at 21, available in 1996 WL-WSJA 3330507.
170.
Ronald E. Yates. U.S. Investors Enter Vietnam at Own Risk Status,
Competition Puts Americans at a Disadvantage,FRESNO BEE, May 15, 1995, at E5,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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1974 Act that must be included in a trade agreement with the
United States. In so doing, Vietnam could help facilitate trade
negotiations when they do, in fact, occur.

V. CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

According to the 1974 Act, the U.S. President may extend
MFN status to Vietnam only after the United States has
17 1
negotiated a bilateral commercial agreement with Vietnam.
Such a presidential proclamation, however, as well as the trade
agreement, may be executed only after the U.S. Senate and House
of Representatives each adopt a concurring resolution approving

the extension of MFN status to Vietnam. 17 2 Although Congress
has supported both the termination of the trade embargo against
Vietnam and the recent diplomatic normalization with that
country, 1 73 Vietnam's unresolved POW and MIA issues, as well as
Its human rights abuses, may negatively influence the
determination of Vietnam's trading status with the United States.
A. Accountingfor U.S. POWs and MIAs In Vietnam
According to U.S. government officials, "Obtaining the fullest
possible accounting for [U.S.] POW and MIAs remains the
[Clinton] Administration's highest priority in relations with
Vietnam." 174

The specific role of the United States in Vietnam

and the approach it has taken in pursuit of this goal, however,
has sparked a debate in Congress that transcends party lines and
represents the most significant threat to Vietnam's attainment of
MFN trading status. 175 Legislators backed by U.S. businesses are
pushing for economic normalization with Vietnam. 17 6 Legislators
representing families of missing U.S. soldiers and veteran groups
believe that maintaining the status quo of U.S.-Vietnamese
relations will result in a more expedient method of accounting for

171.
19 U.S.C. § 2434(a) (1980).
172. 19 U.S.C. § 2437(c)(1) (1980).
173. For a time line outlining the events leading up to the current
relationship between the United States and Vietnam, see Mark T. Kehoe, U.S.Vietnam Relations, Wire Stories, June 20, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 9164258.
174. Human Rights in Vietnam, supra note 81. See also Adrian Edwards,
Vietnam Lauds Nomination of FormerPOW as New Envoy, Hous. CHRON., May 26,
1996, at 25.
175. See, e.g., Dole Vows to Block Relations with Vietnam, AUSTIN AM.STATESMEN, July 22,

176.

1995, at A5.

Donna Cassata, Final Battle of Vietnam War May be FoughtIn Congress,
53 CONG. Q. WKLY.REP. 1583, 1583 (1995).
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the remaining POWs and MIAs of the Vietnam War. 17 7 The
outcome of this controversy could be the determinative factor in a
congressional effort to grant MFN treatment to Vietnam.
The Clinton Administration asserts that the recent progress
made in U.S.-Vietnamese relations has resulted in Vietnam's
increased effort to account for the remaining POWs and MIAs of
the Vietnam War. 178 After President Clinton announced a plan to
press for greater cooperation from Vietnam in 1993, the remains
of thirty-nine U.S. soldiers were brought back to the United
States from Vietnam, making 1993 one of the most productive
years for recovering the remains of U.S. MIAs since the end of the
Vietnam War. 1 79 Since 1993, 174 sets of remains, including
thirty-one in 1995, have been repatriated through the joint
activities of the United States and Vietnam. 180 As a result, fortyfive U.S. soldiers lost in the Vietnam War have been identified and
returned to their families since 1993.181
Similarly, Vietnam has cooperated with the United States to
reduce the number of discrepancy cases from 196 U.S. soldiers to
fifty-five. 1 82
Such U.S.-Vietnamese collaboration has also
resulted in a trilateral cooperation with Laos, whereby Vietnamese
residents that witnessed possible deaths of U.S. soldiers in Laos
during the Vietnam War accompany U.S. officials to accident
sites, enabling the United States to locate and investigate the
crash cites and graves of U.S. soldiers. 8 3 Furthermore, in 1995,
Vietnam surrendered 295 documents containing information
about unresolved cases of U.S. MIAs an act that President Clinton

177. Id. See, e.g.. Delores Apodaca Alfond, National Chairperson of National
Alliance of Families. Testimony Before the House Military Personnel Comm., Cong.
Test. (FDCH) June 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10828730.
178.
Human Rights In Vietnam. supra note 81. See also MA Relatives Press
for More U.S.-Vietnamese Efforts, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 19, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 3874778.
179.
U.S. - Vietnam POW/MA Progress: Lifting the Embargo: Statement
Before the Subcomm. of E. Asian and Pac. Aff. of the Sen. Foreign Rel. Comm.,
available in LEXIS, News Library. ACHNWS File (Feb. 28, 1994) (statement of
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs).
180. Human Rights in Vietnam, supra note 81. For an example of Vietnam's
participation in locating the remaining POW and MIAs of the Vietnam War, see
POW/MA Issues: Testimony of Kent M. Wiedemann, Dep. Assist. Sec. of State for
E. Asian and Pac. Aff., Before the House Comm. on Nat'l Security, Subcomm. on
Military Personnel, June 19, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 10828646.
181.
Human Rights in Vietnam, supra note 81.

182.

Id, "Discrepancy cases" represent those instances where the fate of

U.S. soldiers believed to have been captured alive remain unknown. See, e.g.,
Clinton: Vietnam Cooperating Well on MIA Search, Xinhua English Newswire, May
31, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10545724.

183.

Id.
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attributes to renewed relations with Vietnam.18 4 According to the
congressional proponents for establishing nondiscriminatory

trading status with Vietnam, such tangible progress warrants the
grant of MFN treatment to Vietnam in an effort to continue
accounting for U.S. POWs and MIAs and to reward Vietnam for its
85
cooperation. 1
Congressional opponents to normalizing economic relations
with Vietnam disagree that the progress made in accounting for
the U.S. POWs and MIAs of the Vietnam War has been
substantial. Opponents accuse the Clinton Administration of
distorting facts in order to meet its economic agenda. According
to Senator Bob Smith, a veteran and leading opponent to trade
with Vietnam, Vietnam is not being fully cooperative with regard

to several hundred POW and MIA cases.' 8 6

Senator Smith

maintains that Pentagon analysts have proven the existence of
records of at least 250 MIA cases from Laos that have not been
surrendered by Vietnam. 187 In an attempt to explain Vietnam's
failure to submit such documents to the United States, one
analyst believes that these documents contain evidence that the
Vietnamese either killed U.S. soldiers or allowed them to die of
starvation or battle injuries. These elements of war could severely
impair Vietnam's goal of MFN treatment. 8 8 Senator Smith, who
is joined by other opponents to trade with Vietnam, insists that
nothing less than full disclosure by the Vietnamese of the "hardcore" cases in both Laos and Vietnam will prevent him from
"doing everything [he] can to ensure that the Vietnamese are fully
forthcoming on the POW and MIA issues-including cutting the
184. Id. Though the Clinton Administration maintains that the surrender of
war documents represents a renewed cooperation on behalf of Vietnam, critics
question the value of the documents which may lack new information regarding
U.S. MIAs and POWs in Vietnam. POW-MIA Issue Downplayed as Viet Ties Near,
Hous. CHRON., July 8, 1995, at 22.
185.
See, e.g., Jill Zuckman, Kerry, McCain Share a Goal Over Vietnam.
BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 1995, at 1.
186.
U.S. Government Knowledge of POW/MIAs in Vietnam, Congressional
Testimony Before the House Nat'i Sec. Subcomm. on Military Personnel, Dec. 14,
1995, available in 1995 WL 13415547 (testimony of Sen. Bob Smith). See, e.g.,
Alan G. Lance, Americans Deserve a Full, Complete Accounting of POWs, MIAs,
IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 19, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10504364; Carl M.
Cannon, Critics Deny Vietnamese Are Aiding MIA Search as Clinton Nears
Diplomatic Ties, Some Dispute Claims, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, July 8, 1995, at Al,
availablein 1995 WL 9355316.
187. Id. Some opponents to normalizing relations with Vietnam claim that
an even greater number of documents exist and that Vietnam could unilaterally
solve hundreds of MIA and POW cases if pressured. See, e.g., CongressmanTurns
Up Heat on Vietnam, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 14, 1995, available in 1995 WL
11485418.
188.
William F. Buckley, Jr., Hanoi Ties Not a Moral Issue, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss, July 18, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5569056.
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funds for full diplomatic and economic relations if that's what it
takes to send a message to President Clinton and the Vietnamese
Government."' 89
Although full disclosure of Hanoi's records has not yet been
achieved, many senators and representatives believe that
continued improvements in U.S.-Vietnamese relations will lead to
that result.
Supporters of a trade agreement with Vietnam
advocate a "step-by-step, carrot and stick approach" to
normalizing relations. t90 Granting MFN treatment to Vietnam
could reward Vietnamese participation in settling the POW and
MIA issues, while implying that additional concessions will be
made if Vietnam continues to cooperate with the United States.
Furthermore, broadening the U.S. presence in Vietnam could
result in an even greater recovery of lost U.S. soldiers in
Vietnam. 191
At the forefront of this position are Republican Senator John
McCain, a Vietnam veteran who spent six years as a POW, and
Democratic Senator John Kerry, also a Vietnam veteran. 192 In
1994, these senators sponsored a non-binding amendment,
approved by a 62-38 vote in the Senate, supporting an end to the
economic embargo against Vietnam. 193 One week later, Clinton
acted with this congressional support and ended the nineteenyear ban on trade with Vietnam. 1 9 4 According to Senator Kerry,
"To continue to punish Vietnam will continue to make it difficult
to get the answers for families" whose relatives fought in Vietnam
1 95
and have not been located.
Critics of Clinton's plan for normalization argue that the
President's policy of employing incentives to obtain POW and MIA
information from Vietnam has failed and only serious negotiations
19 6
coupled with a firm approach can lead to the desired result.
According to one U.S. Representative, proof that Clinton's
approach has not been successful is evidenced by Vietnam's
189. U.S. Government Knowledge of POWIMIAs in Vietnam. supra note 186.
190. James A. Baker, III, Outlook. "Road Map" leads to Hanoi, Hous.
CHRON., July 16, 1995, at 1.
191. Id. See also Jonathon Alter & Ron Moreau, Binding Up Old Wounds,
NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1995, at 34, 35; Stewart M. Powell, Clinton Makes Vietnam
Ties Official, S.F. EXAMINER, July 11, 1995, at Al.

192.

Zuckman, supra note 185, at 1. See also Jim Abrams, McCain Backs

Renewed Ties to Vietnam, Ex-POW Sees Full Relations as a Way to Deal with
China'sRole in Region, L.A. DAILY NEWS. July 10, 1995, at N9.
193. Senators Unite on Vietnam Trade; Cooperation on MIAs Helps Heal
Wounds, CINCINNATI POST, Jan. 28. 1994, at 2A.
194. Carroll J. Doherty, Clinton Lifts Vietnam Trade Ban After Senate
Provides Cover. CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Feb. 5. 1994, at 256.
195. John Aloysius Farrell, U.S. Mends Fence with Viets; Clinton to Extend
DiplomaticRelations Today, DENVER POST, July 11, 1995, at Al.
196. U.S. Government Knowledge of POW/MIAs In Vietnam, supra note 186.
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failure to surrender information about the remains of POWs and

MIAs that should be easy to locate and provide. 1 97 Using the past
behavior of Communist Vietnam as an indicator of the future,
congressional opponents to normalization declare that Vietnam
only responds to U.S. demands when the United States makes it
clear that it will go no further to meet Vietnam's agenda until
cooperation has been obtained.19 8
According to opponents trade with Vietnam, the United
States should force Vietnam to "come clean" on the POW and MIA
issues before providing additional concessions, because Vietnam
needs U.S. business investments, economic experience, and
management know-how. 19 9 Congress advocated this position, in
December of 1995, with the passage of an appropriations act that
contained a provision entitled, "Limitation on the Use of Funds for
Diplomatic Facilities in Vietnam." 20 0 The amendment provided for
a presidential certification of Vietnam's cooperation with the
United States in regard to its resolution of discrepancy cases,
recovery of United States remains, surrender of documents, and
implementation of trilateral investigations with Laos. 20 Although
President Clinton vetoed this legislation, 20 2 it demonstrated that
extending MFN treatment to Vietnam could create controversy in
Congress. Moreover, the amendment proved the emphasis that

197.
141 CONG. REC. E1083-02 (daily ed. May 19, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Benjamin A. Gilman).
198.
Vietnam POW/MIA Full DisclosureAct, 141 CONG. REC. S6912-04 (daily
ed. May 18, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bob Smith).
199.
Id.
See also Smith Slams State Department's Push for Vietnam
Recognition, Govt Press Releases (FDCH), June 13, 1995, available In 1995 WL
14249721.
200.
141 CONG. REc. S18127-05, S18159 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1995). This
proposed provision, included in the Judiciary Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year
1996, stated that:
None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by [the] Act
may be obligated or expended to pay for any cost incurred for: (1) opening
or operating any U.S. diplomatic or consular post in the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam that was not operating on July 11, 1995; (2) expanding any
U.S. diplomatic or consular post in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam that
was operating on July 11, 1995; or (3) increasing the total number of
personnel assigned to U.S. diplomatic or consular posts in the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam above the levels existing on July 11, 1995, unless the

President certifies within 60 days, based upon all information available to

the U.S. Government, that the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam is fully cooperating with the United States ....
Id.

201.
202.
1995).

Id.
141 CONG. REc. H15166-02, H15166-H15167 (daily ed. Dec.

19,
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regard to the
Congress places upon tangible results 2with
03
unresolved POW and MIA issues in Vietnam.
Congressional proponents of free trade with Vietnam will

likely receive resistance from veteran groups, POW and MIA
family organizations, and legislators who believe a firm stance
against Vietnam will best promote its participation in resolving
war issues.
Regardless of the battle ahead, however, an
immediate presidential push for economic normalization with
Vietnam seems unlikely, as does additional congressional
support, as Clinton and many legislators face the November
election. 20 4 In the meantime, Vietnam must continue in its
cooperation with the United States to uncover missing U.S.
soldiers and respond to congressional critics by making tangible
progress in the 2,000 U.S. veterans still missing as a result of the
Vietnam War.
B. Human Rights

The 1974 Act does not refer to a country's human rights
record as a condition precedent for granting MFN status. Since
the Chinese incident at Tienanmen Square in 1989,205 however,
Congress has essentially required that a country seeking
normalized trade relations with the United States must meet
United States and international standards for protecting and
assuring the fundamental human rights of its citizens. 20 6 As a

203. Recently, to validify President Clinton's commitment to POWs and
MIAs in his negotiations for trade with Vietnam, the U.S. Legislature included a
provision in the 1996 budget that blocked U.S. funds for U.S. diplomatic posts
and officials in Vietnam until the President certified Hanoi's cooperation in fully
resolving the POW and MIA cases that have yet to be settled. Bill Gertz, Budget
Law Requires Vietnam to Act on POW's, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at A4.

President Clinton made such a certification in May of 1996. Opponents of U.S.-

Vietnam normalization question the truth of Clinton's assertion. White House
Satisfied with Hanoi on MIA's, RECORD (N.J.), May 31, 1996, at A24.
204. Jim Mann, Dealing with the Foreigners,FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan.

26, 1996, at 33.
205. In 1989, upon the death of Hu Yaobang, a former Secretary-General of
China's Communist Party, students gathered in BeiJing's Tianemen Square to
protest high inflation, mismanaged government reform programs, and government
corruption. See Ben Tierney, Student Unrest Causes Alarm In Bejing. VANCOUVER
SUN, Apr. 22, 1989, at B1. Protesters sought democracy, rehabilitation, a free
press, and vindication of Hu. Id. The protest resulted in over 3000 deaths and
10,000 injuries when soldiers opened fire on students and civilians to quash the
potential establishment of what the government feared would be "bourgeois
republic." James Wallace et al., China: What Price Peace? The Military Has Saved
the Hard-linersfor Now, But Its Own Unity Is Shattered, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 19, 1989, at 20, 20.
206.

U.S.-VIETNAM NORMALIZATION, supra note 2, at 10.
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result, Vietnam must make substantial progress in its human
rights practices before Congress can approve a trade agreement.
The Vietnamese government currently operates a national
system of surveillance through domicile registration and

Communist

party-appointed

block

wardens

who

monitor

individual activities through informants. 2 07
Likewise, the
Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) selectively censors mail, seizes
packages, and monitors telephone conversations, while
maintaining additional control over its citizens by restricting the
number of children a family may have. 20 8 In addition, the
Vietnamese government prohibits speech that questions the role
of the governing party regime, promotes a multi-party democracy,
20 9
or discusses certain matters such as human rights.
Vietnamese officials also restrict the right of assembly by
requiring those wishing to congregate to obtain a permit, which
can be arbitrarily denied by local authorities. 2 10 A failure to
comply with this restriction can lead to arrest, trial in a court
controlled by the VCP, and a lengthy prison term for a crime
against the state.2 1 1 All of these Vietnamese practices represent
hurdles for trade negotiations with U.S., for they will be
considered by U.S. legislators who ultimately determine Vietnam's
trading status with the United States. Furthermore, the VCP's
official practices will be emphasized by opponents to trade with
Vietnam if a presidential proclamation providing Vietnam with
MFN treatment is submitted to Congress.
Vietnam has, however, recently progressed in its approach to
human rights by maintaining its commitment to the rule of law

207. Vietnam Human Rights Practices, 1994. supra note 63, at *10-11.
Though restrictions on daily life in Vietnam have reportedly eased, Including the
surveillance of Vietnamese citizens, individuals whom the government believes to
be "reactionary" are closely monitored by informants and plain-clothed police.
Mike Jendrzeczyk, Wash. Dir. of Human Rights Watch/Asia, Testimony Before the

House Int'l Relations Comm., Subcomm. on Int'l Operations & Human Rights and
Asia & the South Pacific, Nov. 8, 1995, available In 1995 WL 10888941, at *4-5,
208.
Vietnam Human Rights Practices, 1994, supra note 63. at *11-12.
Additionally, with the increased use of computerized communications, Vietnam
has begun to formulate a means of controlling the information flow from
cyberspace into that country. Keith B. Richburg, FutureShock: Surfing the Net in
'Nam; Like Other Authoritarian Regimes, Hanoi Fears "Virtual Democracy" of
Cyberspace,WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1995, at A24.
209.
Vietnam Human Rights Practices, 1994, supra note 63, at *12-13. See
Human Rights and Democracy in Asia, Testimony of John Shattuck, Asst. Sec. For
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1995 WL 8643511. at *21-22.
210.
Vietnam Human Rights Practices, 1994. supra note 63, at *17.
211. Id. at *8. See also Adam Schwarz, Arrested Development- Crackdown
at Home Follows OpeningAbroad, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 7, 1995, at 33.
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and allowing some latitude for criticism of its policies.212

For

example, in 1994, the VCP permitted discussion and public
criticism of its administrative procedures, bureaucratic lethargy,
government corruption, and economic policy.2 13 Similarly, the
recently revised labor code in Vietnam recognizes the right of
These changes represent Vietnam's
laborers to strike. 2 14
willingness to make political improvements and solicit increased
trade activity.
Congressional proponents of trade with Vietnam believe that
extending MFN status to Vietnam will foster additional progress in
human rights through a balance of U.S. pressure and economic
advances. 2 15 Opponents of trade with Vietnam, however, argue
that the grant of MFN status to Vietnam will eliminate a major
negotiating tool and will cause Vietnam to initiate few tangible
improvements to its human rights abuses in order to receive
concessions from the United States. 2 16 Nevertheless, Vietnam
must recognize that its human rights practices will be scrutinized
by Congress when it decides whether to extend nondiscriminatory
treatment to the products of Vietnam. Though the Vietnamese,
Constitution provides for many freedoms pertaining to speech,
assembly, and religion, 2 17 until the VCP recognizes and supports
the validity of such provisions, Vietnam's superficial laws will
have little effect on congressional opinion. For these reasons,
Vietnam must continue to improve its current human rights
regime, while waiting for diplomatic normalization with the United
States, and congressional consideration of granting MFN
treatment to Vietnam.

212.

U.S. Vietnam Relations - Issues and Implications, supra note 82.

See

also Vietnam Is Reforming, Official Says; ChristopherRaises Rights Issue on Trip,
ATLANTA J., Aug. 7, 1995, atA4.

213. Vietnam Human Rights Practices,1994. supra note 63, at *12.
214. Id. at *34. Though the Vietnamese Labor Code, adopted by the
National Assembly in May of 1994 and implemented in January of 1995, creates
specific employment rights such as the freedom to join trade unions and to strike,
enforcement has proven difficult, making the reform inadequate. Andrew Nette,
Vietnam-Labor, Union Movement Negotiates Mixed Bag of Reforms, Inter Press
Serv., Apr. 27, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 9810280.

215. SUTTER, supra note 32, at CRS-7.
216. See Id.; see also Dina Elboghdady, O.C. Lawmakers Oppose Full
Relations; Politics: They Say Normalization Should Hinge on MIA and Human Rights
Issues, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 11, 1995, at A10, available in 1995 WL
5859621.

217.

Vietnam Human Rights Practices,1994. supra note 63, at *12.
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VI. STRIVING FOR RESULTS

In 1986, Vietnam's annual inflation rate reached 700%,
starvation threatened the nation's farmers, and the economy
2 18
depended solely upon monetary aid from the Soviet Union.
Recognizing the need for substantial economic change, the
Vietnamese government implemented "Doi Moi," a program of
economic, social, and political reform aimed at transforming the
financial system into a market economy. 2 19 As a result of the
nation's efforts, Vietnam sustained an impressive level of
economic improvement over a ten-year period. This growth
culminated in a nine and one-half percent growth rate in its gross
domestic product in 1995 and a low inflation rate remaining
under thirteen percent in the same year. 2 20 Food production has
increased by nearly one-half since 1987.221 Vietnam has become
a major exporter in less than a decade with a total trade turnover
of $12.74 billion in 1995, a forty-eight percent increase from the
previous year. 2 2 2 The question remains as to why Vietnam, a
country dubbed Asia's next economic tiger, 2 23 would willingly
succumb to U.S. demands in an attempt to receive MFN trading
status.
When Vietnam executed Doi Moi in 1986, the government
hoped to induce domestic and commercial development, enhance
economic cooperation with foreign entities, and increase exports
based upon an effective use of its natural resources and
manpower. 22 4 Since that time, the Vietnamese government has

closely monitored the country's economic development and, in
response to Vietnam's successful renovation process, has adopted
the Strategy for Socio-Economic Stabilization and Development
until the Year 2000 (hereinafter Strategy 2000).225 This strategy
218.
Steven Butler, Vietnam's Next Crusade Twenty Years After the War's
End, a Former Foe Struggles to Transform Its Communist Ways, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 1, 1995, at 55, 58.
219. Luke Aloysius McGrath. Vietnam's Struggle to Balance Sovereignty,
Centralization,and ForeignInvestment under Dot Mot, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2095,
2095-96 (1995).
220. Vietnam Trade Deficit Balloons to 2.3 Billion Dollars in '95, ASIAN ECON.
NEWS, Jan. 8, 1996.
221.
Butler, supranote 218.
222. Vietnam Trade Deficit Balloons to 2.3 Billion Dollars In 95, supra note
220. Total trade turnover represents the sum of Vietnam's total Imports and
exports for a given year.
223. Richard Korman, World Projects Hanoi to World: Let's Make a Deal,
ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Nov. 1, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2387922.
224. Camellia Ngo, Foreign Investment Promotion: Thailand as a Modelfor
Economic Development In Vietnam, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 67, 72
(1992).
225. Ngo Quang Xuan, Vietnam: PotentialMarket and New Opportunities, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 32, 33 (1995).
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seeks to overcome Vietnam's standing as a poverty-stricken and
underdeveloped country, create better conditions for rapid
economic development, and double 1990's Gross Domestic
To achieve these goals,
Product (GDP) by the year 2000.226
rate of ten to twelve
GDP
growth
annual
sustain
an
Vietnam must
percent throughout the current decade and increase its industrial
year. 2 27
per
percent
sixteen
to
fifteen
by
output
Nondiscriminatory trade with the United States is therefore
crucial for Vietnam.
Until the lift of the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam in
1994, the United States prohibited foreign investment in Vietnam
and restricted economic and financial assistance to Vietnam from
Such economic sanctions prevented
multilateral agencies. 2 28
many other countries from supplying Vietnam with needed
investment as well, for many industrial nations did not want to
frustrate their trade relations with the United States.
Additionally, other industrialized nations opposed Vietnam's
presence

in

Cambodia.2 2 9

Since

the United

States began

negotiations with Vietnam to normalize relations and Vietnam
pulled its troops out of Cambodia, direct foreign investment and
23 0
economic assistance have begun to pour into Vietnam.
Vietnam's grant of MFN trading status, however, will result in an
even greater influx of capital, while creating another market for
Vietnamese exporters to exploit. Furthermore, the normalized
relations with the United States will substantiate Vietnam's
economic progress in the world community. Such an event will
likely encourage additional investments in Vietnam from other
industrial nations wishing to take advantage of Vietnam's
inexpensive, yet intelligent, labor supply, whose work product
could be exported around the globe without the imposition of any
major trade sanctions.

After analyzing the many problems

that threaten its

industrial modernization, Vietnam has recognized that it must
obtain $50-55 billion in foreign capital in the next five years to
Many Vietnamese
meet the objectives of Strategy 2000.231
business people hope that U.S. investments will comprise a
majority of that figure, since Vietnam admires U.S. technology,
226. Id.
227. Id. at 36.
228. J. Clifford, et al., American Involvement In Vietnam, PartHf: Prospectsfor
U.S. Business n a New Era, Bus. HORIZONS, Mar. 1, 1995, at 21, 21-22, available
In 1995 WL 8685878.
229. See Id.
230. Id. For an examination of the U.S. momentum-building investments in
Vietnam. see Marc Lavine, Lacklustre U.S. Investment in Vietnam May Go Gold In
'95, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 2, 1995. availablein 1995 WL 7755001.
231. Ngo QuangXuan, supra note 225, at 32, 37.
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businesses, and laws. 2 32 Because economic relations have not

yet normalized between Vietnam and the United States, however,
U.S. investment in Vietnam remains far below its potential, with a
total value of only $525 million, ranking the U.S. eighth among
countries with investments in Vietnam. 2 33 Moreover, neither
Vietnam nor the United States benefit from stalled trade
negotiations as Vietnam hopes to export agricultural products,
textiles, and consumer goods to the United States. Vietnam is
also desperately in need of U.S. machinery, agricultural products,
and airplanes for industrial development. 23 4 Only through total
economic normalization with the United States, including the
grant of MFN status, will Vietnam reach its economic objectives
for the year 2000.
VII. CONCLUSION

Although Vietnam has developed substantially since the
implementation of Doi Moi, it is still a poor country with over
eighty percent of its population living in rural areas and a per
capita GDP of about $250.235 U.S. investment, however, will
enable Vietnam to reach its economic goal of attaining an efficient
market economy and becoming an active participant in the global
market. Furthermore, applying nondiscriminatory treatment to
Vietnamese goods entering the United States will foster additional
trade between the two nations, as well as additional investments
in Vietnam, where foreign capital is the key to its economic
future.
Unfortunately for both countries, obstacles outside the
requirements of the 1974 Act remain that will slow U.S. trade
developments with Vietnam. On the U.S. front, the upcoming

presidential election poses a serious threat to the future of U.S.Vietnam relations. The Clinton Administration has indicated that
it will focus upon the MFN trading status of China in 1996 and
leave the question of a trade agreement with Vietnam for 1997,
after the election in November of 1996.236 Furthermore, the
232. Butler, supra note 218, at 55. Moreover, the Vietnamese desire for
Western products has positioned many U.S. businesses such as PepsiCo to
exploit current market conditions in Vietnam. See J. Clifford, supra note 228.
233. Ngo Quang Xuan, supra note 225, at 32, 38-39. See also Bruce
Stanley. Vietnam Doesn't ForeseeBig Boom in U.S. Investment, AP, July 13, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 4397023.
234. Ngo Quang Xuan, supranote 225, at 38.
235. Clifford, supra note 228. See also Asia-Poverty: Bright Lights, Dark
Alleys, Inter Press Serv., Oct. 18, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 10135003.
236. Owen Ulman, Washington Outlook. Capital Wrap-up: The China
Syndrome, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 19, 1996, at 45.
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Republican presidential nominee, Robert Dole, has vocally
opposed President Clinton's normalization with Vietnam and has
vowed to fight the grant of MFN status to Vietnam. 23 7 For these
reasons, Vietnam is assured a wait of at least another year before
receiving MFN status. Conceivably, it also may face a four-year
hiatus in negotiations with the United States if Dole wins the
November election.
Likewise, in Vietnam, government leaders have voiced
disappointment in the United States for its failure to continue
diplomatic normalization efforts through the consummation of a
trade agreement and the extension of MFN status. 23 8 In fact,
some Vietnamese officials have stated that their voluntary
cooperation with the U.S. POW and MIA issues has not been
adequately recognized and reciprocated amidst U.S. criticism of
Vietnam's human rights abuses. 2 3 9 Party leaders have indicated
that the value of the U.S.-Vietnam trade relationship will be a
subject of debate in upcoming congressional meetings in Vietnam.
Some party members suggest abandoning trade negotiations with
24 0
the United States in favor of China.

Because U.S.-Vietnam relations are at a temporary standstill,
Vietnam will have to go elsewhere for the investment capital
necessary to accomplish its objectives of Strategy 2000. This may
not only impede Vietnamese economic progress, but may also
frustrate the plans of U.S. businesses hoping to profit from
Vietnam's investment opportunities and immense labor supply.
In the interim, Vietnam is well-advised to pay close attention to
the 1974 Act and continue its progress on emigration and human
rights issues, while the U.S. braces itself for a potential political
change.
Davis Frye*
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